Asset sharing and stakeholder arrangements : human capital investments, the distribution of powers, and the role of property rights and economic institutions

[摘要] Theories of human capital investment, which emphasize encouraging and protecting investments in human capital, have become salient in rationalizing the adoption of firm asset-sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements, such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Yet, mechanisms such as bargaining power have also been a key part of the literature on employee and firm bargaining outcomes. Part of the puzzle with bargaining power as an explanation is that not all forms of bargaining power significantly explain the adoption of firm asset sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements. In order to provide an improved explanation for the adoption of these arrangements, we utilize distributive conceptions of property rights and economic institutions to highlight how power is allocated, segmented, and distributed by economic institutions and, thus, impacts firm asset sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements.

[发布机构] Massachusetts Institute of Technology