Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium

[摘要] We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. it consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two evolutionarily stable strategies: the efficient one in which the population is in a state with a maximal payoff and the risk-dominant one where players are averse to risk. We show that for a large range of parameters of our dynamics, even if the initial conditions in both habitats are in the basin of attraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium (with respect to the standard replication dynamics without migration), in the long run most individuals play the efficient strategy. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

[发布日期] 2005-12-21

[关键词] evolutionary games;population dynamics;evolutionarily stable strategy;equilibrium selection;replicator dynamics