Models of corruption

[摘要] In this thesis we formulate two theoretical models of corruption making two contributions to Economic literature. First, we formulate a model where economic agents (who would want to work in the bureaucracy), heterogeneous in their public sector motivation i.e. some of them would like to work in the bureaucracy who are the motivated agents while others would not like to work in the bureaucracy. Second we formulate a model with two competing governments where honesty is modelled as a function of bureaucratic wage rate which affects the firm's investment decision to invest in a given bureaucracy of a government. The firm has a choice of investing in either of the two bureaucracies dependent on its proximity to the bureaucracy. Both the above models are based on aspects that are not previously covered in literature. In Chapter 1 we review relevant literature on corruption and the various popular and well-cited models of corruption. We then turn to psychological and organization literature to study motivation and then to studies of competition between governments and its efforts to attract FDI. In Chapter 2 we set up the economic model with motivation and in Chapter 3 we set up the model with competing governments and the efforts to attract FDI.

[发布机构] University:University of Birmingham;Department:Birmingham Business School

[关键词] H Social Sciences;HB Economic Theory