Trading isolation for certifiable randomness expansion

[摘要] A source of random bits is an important resource in modern cryptography, algorithms and statistics. Can one ever be sure that a ;;random;; source is truly random, or in the case of cryptography, secure against potential adversaries or eavesdroppers? Recently the study of non-local properties of entanglement has produced an interesting new perspective on this question, which we will refer to broadly as Certifiable Randomness Expansion (CRE). CRE refers generally to a process by which a source of information-theoretically certified randomness can be constructed based only on two simple assumptions: the prior existence of a short random seed and the ability to ensure that two or more black-box devices do not communicate (i.e. are non-signaling). In this work we make progress on a conjecture of [Col09] which proposes a method for indefinite certifiable randomness expansion using a growing number of devices (we actually prove a slight modification of the original conjecture in which we use the CHSH game as a subroutine rather than the GHZ game as originally proposed). The proof requires a technique not used before in the study of randomness expansion, and inspired by the tools developed in [RUV12]. The result also establishes the existence of a protocol for constant factor CRE using a finite number of devices (here the constant factor can be much greater than 1). While much better expansion rates (polynomial, and even exponential) have been achieved with only two devices, our analysis requires techniques not used before in the study of randomness expansion, and represents progress towards a protocol which is provably secure against a quantum eavesdropper who knows the input to the protocol.

[发布机构] Massachusetts Institute of Technology