Should an understanding of the theory of evolution have any effect on meta-ethics and if so is Michael Ruse inconsistent in rejecting meta-ethical realism whilst still defending a form of practical moral realism?

[摘要] This dissertation examines the implications of seeing moral beliefs and moral behaviour as evolutionary adaptations. In particular, it discusses whether or not an evolutionary explanation of human moral behaviour should lead us to reject the idea of objective moral facts. I agree with Michael Ruse that moral behaviour can be explained in naturalistic terms. However Ruse believes that this should not lead us to reject some forms of moral realism, as morality is a shared adaptation. My arguments against this are twofold. Firstly I believe that if morality is a product of natural forces then there will be variation between individuals’ moral sense; which should give us cause to reject all forms of moral realism. My second argument is that Ruse is internally inconsistent, and he is trying to ‘sneak’ moral facts back into the picture, having previously rejected them.

[发布机构] University:University of Birmingham;Department:School of Philosophy, Theology and Religion, Department of Philosophy

[关键词] B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion;B Philosophy (General)