Perception and judgement

[摘要] In this thesis, I am arguing for a single claim, namely that perceptual experiences are judgements,and I am arguing for it in a very specific way. This has not been a popular theory, although somehave defended similar theories. One main reason that this has been a historically unpopular theoryis to do with the problems of conflicting beliefs. I can see (strictly speaking, experience) theMüller-Lyer lines as being of different lengths, they look different lengths, and yet I know that theyare the same length. Hence, I have explicit contradictory judgements on a judgement-theory ofexperiences. However, despite this being the major historical obstacle, two widely held theses inthe philosophy of perception in recent times also stand as an impediment to this theory, namely thetheses that experiences have a phenomenal character which individuates them from judgements,and that experiences, unlike judgements or beliefs, have non-conceptual content.I seek to offer an ''incremental defence'' of the judgement-theory of experiences by arguing in stagesagainst the competing theories, and defending the judgement-theory from the objections that arisefrom the motivations for these other theories. As regards the phenomenal character of experience, Iargue that once the representational theory is accepted, the path is open, should a range ofindividuating conceptual contents for experiences be found, to analyse the psychology ofexperience in terms of this content. I define this conceptual content, and then I motivate and defendthe theory that experiences are judgements.

[发布机构] University:University of Glasgow;Department:School of Humanities

[关键词] B Philosophy (General)