Conflict and Content.

[摘要] Speakers differ from one another in philosophically problematic ways.Two speakers can vary not simply with respect to what they believe, but also in the ways they speak, the concepts they employ, and the standards they bring to bear.The fact of imperfect convergence gives rise to a wide range of philosophical puzzles, largely via a single generalization:If two speakers disagree with each other, then at least one of them says something false.The generalization is plausible, but mistaken.Counterexamples are common, diverse, and thoroughly entrenched in ordinary talk, scientific discourse, and philosophical inquiry.I focus on a particular family of counterexamples, disagreements about the proper application of linguistic items, or what I call metalinguistic disagreements.Coming to grips with the widespread existence of metalinguistic disagreement requires a nuanced account of the ways in which information can be transmitted via an utterance, and it suggests a substantial rethinking of conventional philosophical wisdom about the nature of meaning.I begin with a philosophical case study in metalinguistic disagreement—disagreements about aesthetics.I go on to explore the more general linguistic properties of metalinguistic disagreements, focusing on their striking failure to license so-called metalinguistic negation.I conclude with a consideration of semantic methodology, arguing that, despite widely held assumptions to the contrary, metalinguistic disagreements can be adjudicated with reference to objective, non-linguistic features of the world.It is possible therefore to roundly reject a pernicious relativism about scientific discourse while simultaneously allowing for widespread, interpersonal variation in meaning.

[发布机构] University of Michigan

[效力级别] Disagreement

[关键词] Philosophy of Language;Disagreement;Philosophy of Linguistics;Metalinguistic Negation;Aesthetic Disagreement;Naturalness;Philosophy;Humanities;Philosophy