Modale universaliteit

[摘要] English: Universality and individuality are two irreducible traits of entities. In this regard Armstrongis correct in his assumption that individuals and universals exist in states of affairs. Throughthe relation of instantiation it is possible to see universals as identical elements present instates of affairs. The types (kind) of things are made possible through universals. Universalsare modes of being. Propositions are the way things are and relations is the way thingsstand in relation to other things. Universals cannot be unified with individuals. The phenomenologicalviewpoint states that the instantiation of universals can be seen as a quality whichis not universal. This is unacceptable. The trope-theory is also in this regard wrong, becausea trope is viewed as an individual, an instance of its universal.In following Strauss, qualities and relations as instantiated universals cannot be individual.It is only possible to t21 k about the specification of the universal. Hence it is impossible totalk about modal individuality, but only about modal specificity.Nominalism, platonism and conceptualism are associated with finity, denumerable infinityand non-denumerable infinity. It is not possible to count the totality of all sets of positiveintegers. Hence the platonist conclude that non-denumerable sets exist. Constructivismbelieves that it is not the existence of non-denumerable sets that makes counting impossible,but rather the mental incapacity to construct a precise idea of the totality of allsets which defines counting. Wang did not recognize the modal dimension of reality, neitherdid he recognize the antecipatory and retrocipatory direction of the modal aspects of reality.This is the reason why he did not recognize that the non-denumerable infinity is a regulativenumerical anticipation in space.We could divide Hale's discussion of the singular term in three themes. The first deals witha syntactical criterium of the singular term. This means that the identification of a singularterm occurs on grounds of patterns of conclusions with (first level) existential generalizationas basis. The second theme deals with the singular term and the functional term where thefunctional term could be associated with a proper noun. The understanding of the functionalterm depends on the recognition of a functional relation which includes the chosen objectof the singular term.Modal universality was implicitly recognized in the division of objects in different categories.Explicitly modal universality was never recognized. The third theme deals with the distinctionbetween abstract proper nouns and the predicate. This distinction reflects the distinctionbetween law and law-likeness.The distinction between abstract and concrete involves the tension between olatonism andthe nominalistic causal epistemology.The problem is that a omnipresent causal theory of truth is checked by the numerical andspatial aspects of reality. Godell presupposed this when he made a distinction betweenmathematical knowledge and perceptual knowledge. The causal theory of knowledgedoesn't have a total reference to mathematical truth.In the reformational philosophy Stafleu tries to impute individuality structure on spatialfigures. This argument ls untenable, because numerical and spatial figures are modalsubjects and contains modal universality in its orderliness. Modal subjects cannot bereduced to typical structures. It is prominent how Stafleu did not succeed to denotestructure-typicity of the modal subjects.One of the most important points in Hale's view of a sortal concept, is that this concept isgrounded in the relation of similarity. Equivalent classes and equivalent relations play animportant role in the identification of abstract objects of the same sort. The sorta! conceptcan be associated with modal universality with similarity as the ground-relation.Van Fraassen's identity and conclusion problem could be solved when the modal dimensionof reality could be accepted and the association of law with second-order universals couldbe denounced. The distinction between law and events and the necessity-relation arepresupposed when dealing with the identity and conclusion problem.Modal laws can be obtained through abstraction and not through induction. Perception ofa modal aspect does not occur through an empirical-inductive process, because everygeneralization already implies the meaning of the relevant modal aspect.Fowler and Van der Walt's point of view, namely that God's creation order is unrecognisable,does not reckon modal universality. Together with this, the coherent problem of conceptand idea is ignored. Modal terms can be used conceptual or in an idea context. The meaningkernels of the modal aspects exceed conception and is therefore regulative for the use ofconcepts. In this regard, there is already a rational link between God's creation order andour knowledge thereof. This knowledge is however of a regulative foundational kind (i.e.idea-knowledge).In the history of philosophy modal universality has come to the fore as all-embracingdenominators. But sadly the boundaries of the different modal aspects were not recognized.This is called reductionism and it caused the problem that phenomena could not beexplained properly. The Pythagoreans for example believed that numericals were theall-embracing denominator of reality. The heaven (ouranos) was viewed as harmony andnumber. The invention of the irrational number showed the shortcoming of this viewpoint.The hypotenuse of a rectangular triangle cannot be presented with a finite whole number.The mechanistic viewpoint believed that mechanism was the only route to the understandingof nature. Helmholtz was the first to use the energy concept as central mode of explanationof nature as a whole. The important consequence thereof is that the sensual phenomenonof factual conclusions was not good enough for the explanation of principles. The a prioricalmodal dimension of reality embraces every facet of our experience which means that ourexperience cannot be reduced to the psychical aspect of reality. The numerical aspect isfor example the condition for us to experience numerical relations, etc.In biology we find the one-sidedness of the nominalistic theory of descent and the realisticstructural idea (morphology). The first-mentioned induces a chaotical blend which makesthe taxonomical classification of living entities impossible or completely arbitrary. Theidealistic morphology is platonistic. A person do not have to be an idealistic morphologistto be convinced that the systematics of the natural system must form the foundation of thetheory of descent.The significance of Stegmuller's concept of a theory is that the mathematical core of a theoryrefers implicitly to modal universality. This core-structure cannot be falsified and is denotedby Stegmuller as an abstract 'gegenstande'. That which is abstract, contains similarly theproperty of universality. There also exists an implicit discontinuity in Stegmuller's conceptof a theory. It has to do with the nominalistic association of the empirical with concreteindividuality.Stegmuller does not make a distinction between the boundaries of the kinematical andphysical aspects of reality. Furthermore, the distinction between theoretical and non-theoreticalterms implicitly denotes the boundaries between the spatial aspect and the physicalaspect (e.g. in the classical partical-mechanics spatial terms are denoted as non-theoretical).

[发布机构] University of the Free State