Op weg na 'n christelike logika : 'n studie van enkele vraagstukke in die logika met besondere aandag aan D.H.Th. Vollenhoven se visie van 'n christelike logika

[摘要] This study furnishes some results of an investigation toascertain whether the possibility of a Christian logic can bemaintained as a meaningful question. This problem seems to beenmeshed in a complex encompassing the problem of Christianscience* as such. Whether the possibility of a Christian logicis maintained or denied, at any rate this implies a positivestandpoint towards the problem of a Christian logic. Somegeneral remarks having been made in an introductory chapter,the main aspects bearing on the background of differentpoints of view towards logic are presented in Chapter II.<1> The general philosophical conception adopted seemsto be of importance with a view to the formation of aconception of logic in at least and especially two respects. Philosophical trends have a marked influence on the viewtaken of logic. As far as modern philosophy is concerned, onecan point to the differences appertaining to logic, itscharacter, and the domain accorded to logic as science, itsplace in the cosmic reality, etc., differences which becomeevident in the conceptions of, for example, Descartes,Arnauld & Nicole, Kant, Opzoomer, Heymans, Bolland, Dewey,Bergson and Heidegger. Whereas Dewey, Bergson and Heideggermove in an irrationalistic direction, the first mentionedsix philosophers bear evidence of a rationalistic point ofview. The idealistic conception of Kant differs from thescientialism of a Descartes and the practicalism of thewriters of The Port Ro*al Logic; the difference can be tracedto the fact that Kant lends .the divergent solutions furnishedby scientialism and practicalism to a unity, which ascribes tothe ~ human perceptive faculty two functions, a theoreticaland practical; theoretical reason and practical reason areautonomous, each in its particular sphere. The more recentrationalism of an Opzoomer, Heymans and Bolland, keeps to therationalistic main lines but takes the a priori's ofautonomous reason in a dynamic-active sense by laying stresson the scientific methods. Positivism advanced the firstsolution in this direction, overestimating scientific theoryin a scientialistic spirit, with the result that thepractical existence is viewed in the light of science. Thepositivism of a Comte and Opzoomer finds an antipode in theneo-positivism of, for instance, Dilthey, Wundt and Heymans,laying stress on the practical aspect. And then the neoidealismof Cassirer, Bosanquet, Bolland and others bridgesthe opposition between the positivistic and nee-positivisticconceptions. The far-reaching influence of rationalisticconceptions encountered a serious set-back on account of theincreasing importance attached to the se-called critique ofscience and especially the rise of irrationalistic conceptions.Irrationalism accepts reason in a rationalistic sense, butlimits its validity and importance to a specific sphere. ThepragQatism of James and Dewey, for instance, supports scienceonly in so far as it furthers practical purposes: one has toobey reason in order to experiment, but the important pointis exactly the fact that one is busy experimenting on accountof a need bearing on practical life. A second trend, thephilosophy of life which had an eminent exponent in Bergson,emphasizes the importance of life (taken in an organicpsychovitalisticsense) instead of practical utility, andtherefore accentuates intuition in contrast to the symbolicoperational method of intelligence (which belong to thedomain of logic). And finally existentialistically-mindedphilosophers champion the cause of human existence, of theindividual concrete situation. It is pointed out that thesedifferences in philosophical conception result in differentpoints of view taken of logic. Secondly the specifictype of philosophical point of view is an ontological factorof supreme importance in the realisation of a conception oflogic. Kant and Hegel, for instance, both advance anidealistic conception, but differ as to the type ofphilosophical point of view; for Hegel attaches himself to acontradictory type whereas Kant propounds an ennoeticconception which regards the sensations as furnishing thematerial for the forms of the intellect, that is to say, theintellect has the sensations as contents of the mind.Moreover I may refer to the interaction-theory of a Descartesand the instrumentistic point of view of a Bergson or thepsychomonistic type represented by a Heymans, etc. Eachparticular type of philosophical conception involves aspecific cosmology and anthropology, and results in aparticular conception of logic and the problems of this branchof science.<2> In addition to the above mentioned ontologicalmatters, it is necessary to point separately to the importanceof epistemological factors for one's conception of logic.This point is illustrated by enumerating some basic problemsof a theory of knowledge and explaining a few points ingreater detail, for instance, the possibility andsuppositions of knowledge; the analysis of knowledge(including the essence, character and kinds of knowledge),the formation of knowledge, the purpose of knowledge and theunity of knowledge (including limits and scope of knowledge,the partial nature and coherence of knowledge); and thevalidity of knowledge (including knowledge and law, knowledgeand value, as well as the reliability of knowledge).<3> In yet another respect different points of view mayarise, viz. according to the opinion held as to logic asscience, its character and domain, and the investigation ofthe logical field. There is, for instance, a trend in logicwhich attempts to approach the field of logic from that ofmathematics, and on the other hand some logicians undertakethe task of studying the basic principles of mathematics withlogic as the starting-point. Moreover, also the points ofview of psychologism in logic (Sigwart) and Husserl'sreaction against this trend, tend to show that the scientificdetermination of the field of investigation bears testimonyto the fact that the logician cannot afford to neglect matterswhich can be traced to different attitudes in theory ofscience, and different points of view in regard to thefield of investigation.<4> Lastly the suggestion may be offered that one-sidedstressing of one or more of the different factors ofimportance (mentioned above) as such, may also result indifferent conceptions of logic.* * * Up to this point no attention has been paid to thepossibility of the Christian conviction, the Christian life andworld-view, etc., as an important factor in theformation of a conception of logic. Chapter III gives ageneral survey of the points of view taken on logic in aChristian atmosphere.<1> A Christian logic is an utter impossibility; thisis the first standpoint taken as to this problem. This, pointof view comprises, however, various subordinate solutions ofthe problem. Some argue that as far as the importanceand implications of Christianity are concerned, Christianityis confined to divine worship and this does not bear onlogic in any way whatsoever. Others acknowledge theimportance of Christianity for divine worship, and add:for daily practical life too --- although in no wise forscience and therefore not for logic. A third solutionaccepts the significance of Christianity for a section ofscience, for instance as far as theology is concerned, and also for philosophy, and perhaps in somerespects for other branches of science (e.g. sociology,ethnology, the science of history, etc.) but at any rate notas far as logic is concerned.<2> On the other hand some scientists, inspired by thereformational concept of Calvin, maintain that Christianity,that the Christian view of cosmos and man, the Christianapproach to scientific matters, etc., must be esteemed afactor of importance so far as the conception of science assuch is concerned, and that moreover it is imperative thatall scientific investigations be undertaken in the light ofthe revelation (in Holy Scripture); for this reason amongothers the idea of a Christian logic is not absurd. Thisthesis can be elucidated by mentioning some contributions toa Christian logic, for instance, A. Kuyper's opinionthat science is of two kinds because humanity is of two kinds,those regarding the cosmos as normal and those who take intoaccount the reality of the fall of man in Adam, and thereforeacknowledge the fact that an act of interference on the partof God is necessary to put the cosmos again in a correctrelation to Him. On account of this difference Kuypertherefore maintains the existence of a Christian and non Christianscience. As the fact of sin dit not affect theformal activity of thinking, according to Kuyper, he statesthat the palingenesis does not cause any difference in thisrespect; therefore only one kind of logic exists --- aChristian logic. S.O. Los indicates the necessity of aChristian logic by stating that the Calvinistic principlesought to find application in every section of science, notexcluding logic. A Christian logic takes into account theprinciples of Holy Scripture and brings them to bear uponscientific studies. H.G. Stoker's conception of the cosmosas a created coherent diversity implies i n t era 1 i athat the field of logic has an irreducible, unique characterof its own, but the logical sphere is part of a comprehensivetotality in which all diversity is given in a coherent complex.Because it is a radical diversity, it is unlike the psychical,lingual or ethical sphere, and therefore the logical spheremay not be reduced to any other diversity nor isolated fromthe diversity with which it constitutes a totality. On accountof the fact that cosmic reality is a created diversity, it isnot autonomous nor self-sufficient; a Christian logic thereforenaturally opposes the dogma of the autonomy of thought. C. VanTil points out that whereas the facts and laws with which logicis concerned, are not detached from their being created, thefacts and laws of logic too are not self-sufficient, but partof created reality; accordingly it is imperative that theChristian truths (of, for instance, creation, fall of man intosin, and redemption in Jesus Christ in the communion of theHoly Spirit) be acknowledged from the very beginning. Indeed,as Van Til explains in detail, no part of Christianity remainsintact when once the Arminian logic is allowed to run itscourse. K. Schilder puts forward various considerationsbearing on the impossibility of a formal or neutral logic, andstates that logic has a foundation in fundamentalphilosophical ideas, on account of which a Hegelian, Fiahtianand Calvinist have different conceptions of logic; moreover,logic is not detached from other sciences, and in no sciencecan one find one's way without a standpoint in faith. H. Dooyeweerd's philosophy of the cosmonomic idea statesand illustrates in various respects both the possibility andnecessity of a Christian logic. Especially his theory of thenodal spheres each subjected to its own law, discloses aninsight of great depth concerning the logical sphere as amodal aspect of cosmic reality, having the numerical andspatial aspects, the aspect of mathematical movement, theaspect of physical energy, of organic life and of psychicalfeeling as substratum spheres and the historical andlinguistic aspects, the aspect of social intercourse, the economic, the aesthetic, the jural, the moral aspects and theaspect of faith as superstratum spheres. In its modal nucleuseach sphere enjoys a sovereignty in its own sphere and differsfrom every other modal aspect; on account of retrocipationseach sphere coheres with every previous sphere in the cosmicorder and by means of anticipations with the superstratumspheres, thus presenting also a universality in its ownsphere. The variable phenomena of each sphere functionsubjected to a law of their own, for instance, in the logicalsphere judgements are subjected to the logical (analytical)law; accordingly this subject is treated as the theory of thespheres of law --- a really important milestone on the waytowards a Christian logic, particularly so, as it has provedto be exceptionally useful in determining the characteristicnature of the logical sphere. D.H.Th. Vollenhoven hasestablished the cardinal data of a Christian logic andacquired an insight into such various points of importancefor the problem of a Christian logic, that it is considerednecessary to treat thereof in a separate chapter.* * *The first section of chapter IV is given to a generalsurvey of the more important writings of Vollenhoven in sofar as they contributed towards his conception of a Christianlogic. An attempt is made to show how Vollenhoven arrived athis final conception. This section is also intended to furnishthe basis for an interpretation of his conception, whichfollows in the succeeding parts of chapter IV.<1 > Ontology presents an insight into the differencein the being of God, law and cosmos. God is the Sovereign whocreated the cosmos and put his law to the cosmos. Only God issovereign, i.e. not subjected to the law. It is only of thelaw that one can say that it obtains (for that which issubjected to the law); and the being of the cosmos exists inits being subjected to. the law. The word law can betaken in three different senses: as structural (modal) law, asthe commandment of love, and as positive law. The beingof the cosmos displays a diversity of created subjects,heavenly and earthly. By temporarily disregarding theessentials in which man differs from other things, it ispossible to investigate the being of the thing. It is necessaryto distinguish the being of the subject and the object, bothbeing subjected to the law, but in different respects. Bothhave to be investigated as to the modal (universal) differencesand to the individual differences, as well as their particularrelations and the bonds between modal differences(retrocipations and anticipations) and between individualdifferences (coherences). An object is a complex having asubject as the bearer of object-functions, attributes such ascolour, warmth, etc.; although being more complex than thesubject, subject and object have this in common that they areboth subjected to the law. The structure of man is evenmore complex. Beside modal differences and individualdifferences (having this specific individual characteristicand not that, on account of which this judgement differs fromthat judgment --- although they do-not differ modally asboth are logical), the difference in direction of his functions(good or bad) is of extreme importance as far as the being ofman is concerned. For the different modal functions constitutethe frame for the activities of man, and therefore thelogical sphere is called the logical function. The activitiesof the heart of man (prefunctional) are, as it were, sentinto a specific functional channel; and this activity isdirected by the heart in a twofold exit, namely for better orworse. The structure of the realms (man, animal, plant andmineral) brings us to the genetic bond; and as to thestructure of mankind two points are worth mentioning, viz. the bonds of community (their character, diversity andmutual relation) and religion as the covenant betweenGod, the Creator of heaven and earth, and man. After theparticular relation between heaven and earth has been treated,the bond between God, law and cosmos demands attention.<2> Theory of knowledge is distinct from ontology butnevertheless presupposes a close relation. The theory ofhuman knowledge is discussed in two main sections: thestructure of the non-scientific cognition (including itssuppositions; the knowable; the activity of learning-to-know;the result of knowing; and the bond between the result ofknowing and the activity of learning, the knowable, and thenorm of learning-to-know! and secondly the development of thenon-scientific cognition), and the structure of thescientific cognition (including firstly the cognition inparticular scientists method and the diversity of scientificmethods in particular science, the analysable for particularsciences, and the result of scientific cognition in particularsciences; and secondly the scientific cognition of nonparticularsciences as, for instance, philosophy); thetheory of science investigates particular sciences�?andnon-particular sciences; and c > methodology studies theproblem of method as such, as well as in relation to thedifferent sciences, not excluding logic.<3> Under logic is discussed fundamentalphilosophical questions, including those of philosophy ofthe logical field which discloses an insight into the logicalsphere of law --- which logic has to investigate --(including in particular the question of what the logicalmodality is and how the logical aspect is present in thatwhich subsists gnostically),and philosophy of logic(including, the problem of logic as a science and that of itsrelation to philosophy). Under the general structure ofthe analytical (logical) sphere attention is paid to theanalytical law and the analytically subjected, viz. theanalytical subjects (including the analytical activity, andthe result of this activity: concept and judgment) and theanalytical objects (i.e. the�?analytical aspect of all the sub analytical);furthermore the bond between analytical subjectand object, and lastly the bond between the analytical law andthe analytically subjected, as well as the bond between God,analytical law and the analytically subjected. Under theconcept is discussed the concept as such, the division ofconcepts and the particular relations of concepts. The theoryof judgment likewise avails itself of these three themes fortreating judgment.Chapter V investigates some problems of a more particularnature in the domain of logic; the investigation has had to berestricted to three subjects. <1> The analytical (logical) law. Firstly the question is considered whether an analyticallaw exists, and it is pointed out that logicians who do giveattention to this question usually stress one-sidedly theimportance of either the analysable or the analytical activityor the result of thinking (the thought). As far as thesense of the analytical law is concerned, a point ofparticular importance is Vollenhoven's insight that theanalytical law is specifically an analytical (and no nonanalytical,e.g. a mathematical) law, a structural law,1. e. a modal law, and as law, the boundary betweenGod and cosmos. As to the contents of the analytical law,some critical remarks are made about the conception of e.g.Welton &Monahan, and reference is made to the importance andconsequences of Vollenhoven's synopsis of the contents of theanalytical law: analyse well the analysable, whatever itmay be. The discussion of the question whether theanalytical law can or must be considered as being formal,touches a few facets of the problem and gives some argumentsfor the supposition that it is not formal. Ontology(stating the fundamental distinction between the being ofGod, law and cosmos) appears of cardinal importance also inrespect to the question whether the analytical law be.considered a norm. Finally attention is drawn to fallacies,And the supposition is advanced that one's conception of theanalytical law determines in important respects one's viewheld as to fallacies. Fallacies seem to be due chiefly to thefollowing three causes: by disobeying the analytical norm, by reason of the fact that the substratum-functions ofthe logical function fail and on account of wickedness ofheart.<2> With reference to R. Robinson some points ofimportance concerning the problem of definition are discussed.The attitude is taken that definition is a specific kind ofjudgment, viz. a judgment in which the predicate does notanalyse or evaluate the subject of the judgment, but delimitsthe sphere and scope of the subject, determines it, definesit, that is to say: attributes a predicate to the subject ofa judgment with a scientific purpose. Definition can be given ofconcepts, or words, or the contents of words or of concepts,or the meaning of words. Especially important is the fact thatthe theory about definition presupposes a specific category theory;accordingly a Christian standpoint adopted inscientific study results in a different point of view takentowards definition. Lastly may be mentioned. that thedifference between scientific and non-scientific definitionought not be neglected.<3> The comprehensive problem of the division ofjudgments likewise indicates that a Christian standpoint inscience (logic) does not impede or hamper the investigation ofthe field of logic --- in this case the division of judgments---- but on the contrary furthers scientific study and resultsin a new perspective, opening new fields leading to hithertounexplored data. By comparing the divisions of judgmentsfurnished by Welton & Monahan, Stebbing, De Vleeschauwer andVollenhoven, the conclusion is reached that the point of viewpresupposed by each division determines the criteria employedin the division of judgments; the view is taken that aChristian point of view constitutes an exceptionally liberaland balanced conception of the subject, and in various respectsavoids one-sidedness, partiality and the limitations inherentin some other points of view.From this it is apparent that the consequences andimplications of the point of view taken in the study of logicChapter VI gives a short conclusionary view in which someimportant consequences of the previous expositions areenumerated and a few critical remarks added to illuminate someaspects of the problem.<1> Christian logic furnishes a particularly penetratinginsight into the philosophical basis of logic. Philosophicalmatters influence in fundamental respects the scientificinvestigation of the logical field and it appears imperativethat logic be based on a philosophical conception (fromwhatever point of view adopted). Logic is different fromphilosophy but the scientific activity in the field of logicnevertheless presupposes a philosophical standpoint, asChapter II has indicated. Particularly important is the factthat Vollenhoven could demonstrate the necessity for thelogician to keep in mind both the modality (viz. logical) andthe character (viz. as result of a previous analyticalactivity) of the concept and judgment, as well as toinvestigate the retrocipations and anticipations of thelogical function on sub- and superstratum spheres respectively;logic derives from philosophy the insight that all of this, andthe analytical activity too, belong to the logical sphere. Theconception developed in logic cannot be considered to bedetached from more fundamental philosophical matters nor tobe formal nor neutral.A Christian philosophy is especially necessary with aview to keeping the spheres of ontology and epistemologydistinct, as well as to determine the difference between andthe relationship of logic and on the one hand cosmology andanthropology, and on the other hand epistemology. A Christianlogic reaps the advantages of this distinction.Besides the option of e.g. either rationalism orirrationalism, a Christian standpoint in scientific matters ispracticable. The results of Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven, Stoker,Van Til and others have changed the possibility of a Christianpoint of view in science (including logic) into a reality.Chapter IV especially has indicated that and how a Christianlogic presupposes a Christian philosophy and in Chapter V ithas been possible to point out the importance of a Christianapproach to logic, even in its details.<2> As regards the matter investigated by logic and itscharacter, the point of view is taken that logic is a scienceand that no scientist can•accept his task of investigation orexecute his analysis without a determination of his field ofstudy and the nature of this field, as well as testing theresults obtained with this determination; moreover continuedreflection is necessary as to whether the. investigation hassucceeded in complying with the determination of the field ofinvestigation. The supposition is held that the determinationof the field of investigation is a distinction according tomodality, that is to say logic has to investigate theanalytical (logical) sphere of law. A Christian logic opposesthe various forms of reduction-logic which screen the logicalfield down to some of the most obvious phenomena of thelogical sphere. A Christian logic results in various new finds,as well as a new. perspective of the whole domain of logic.<3> Logic according to a Christian point of view is notwhat it is often thought to be and moreover it is differentfrom the traditional conception. Logic as science is notformal nor neutral. A Christian point of view accepts therelevance of religion and considers the Word of God to be theguiding principle for directing scientific cognition in itsscientific investigation of the logical field. Christianlogic is no logic of religion or vice versa, no logical creed,logical science of belief or a logic of divine worship, nor acompilation of texts from the Holy Scriptures bearing on thelogical function, etc. A Christian logic does not investigatethe logical field from or v 1 a the function of belief.have effects even in the most particular details of the fieldof logic.

[发布机构] North-West University

[效力级别] d1892-1978","Logic"]