An analysis of strategic-military issues in the ending of Civil wars : a case study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1994 – 2004

[摘要] This study is an analysis of how military issues can contribute to a sustainable endingof civil wars particularly in Africa. The continuous warfare in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo (DRC) between 1996 and 2004 is used to understand thenature of civil wars and how they relate to classical strategic theory of war in generaland their termination in particular.According to classical strategic military theory, war must always be guided by clearpolitical objectives. Without this, war becomes an irrational act and spins out ofcontrol. Tactical victory gained in the battlefield over an opponent must be translatedinto strategic victory for war to end sustainably. This can only be done if the politicalobjective of the war has been attained. But also crucial are the terms and conditions ofpeace that the victor offers the defeated opponent.Not all wars end with a tactical victory in the battlefield. In many instances of modernwars, and in particular with the current civil wars in Africa, there is a stalemate. Thisforces the belligerent parties to negotiate. Within the context of the DRC, the first war(1996-1997) ended in a tactical victory for the Rwandan alliance (composed ofRwanda, Uganda and Burundi) over the regime of President Mobutu. However, thisvictory was not translated into strategic victory (long term peace). The alliance,despite having installed a new leader (Laurent Kabila) in the DRC, remained anoccupying force, with the Rwandan military commander taking over the role of theDRC's military chief of staff. This was in part because the political objectives of theRwandan alliance had changed from revenge on Mobutu for sheltering and supportingthe perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda, to economic exploitation of the abundantnatural resources of the DRC. The outcome was that the proxy (Kabila) turned againsthis backers as he sought to gain legitimacy and support from his fellow Congolesecitizens.President Kabila ordered the Rwandan alliance out of the country. The alliance thenstarted a second war (1998-2002) aimed at deposing the former proxy and establishing new proxies. The situation had however changed as the old proxy(Kabila) had acquired new partners (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe). This, apartfrom transforming the DRC war into Africa's first continental war (in terms of thenumber of countries that were eventually involved), turned into a stalemate. Thisresulted in negotiations that took a long time to complete.The first round of negotiations produced the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (LCA) in1999 with two independent tracks that led to two levels of agreements: inter-stateagreements and intra-state agreements. None of these were implementable until 2002when the DRC negotiated with Rwanda and with Uganda separately on militaryissues of the conflict. These negotiations produced the Pretoria Accords between theDRC and Rwanda, and the Luanda Accords between the DRC and Uganda. Thewithdrawal of the militaries of Rwanda and Uganda from the DRC paved way fortheir proxies, The Rally for Congolese Democracy - Goma (RassemblementCongolais pour la Démocratie - RCD-Goma) and the Movement for the Liberation ofCongo (Mouvement de Libération du Congo – MLC) to join the Inter-CongoleseNational Dialogue (ICND) which ended in 2004 without a conclusive agreement onmilitary issues.

[发布机构] University of Pretoria