The other before us? : a Deleuzean critique of phenomenological intersubjectivity

[摘要] This study seeks to give a philosophical account of, and justification for the intuition thatsubjectivity is not a stable 'Archimedean point on the basis of which an intersubjectiverelation can be founded, but is instead profoundly affected by each different 'Other withwhich it enters into a relation.As a preliminary to the positive philosophical account of how this might work in Part IIof the thesis, there is an attempt to critique certain of the classical accounts ofintersubjectivity found in phenomenology, in order to show that these positions cannotgive a satisfactory account of the type of intersubjective relation which gives rise to theabovementioned intuition.The thesis therefore starts off by examining the account of intersubjectivity in Husserl'sCartesian Meditations (especially the Fifth Meditation). Husserl is there engaged in anattempt to overcome the charge of solipsism that might be levelled at phenomenology,since phenomenology is concerned with experience as, by definition, the experience ofthe subject. We try to show that Husserl cannot give a satisfactory account of the Otherbecause he tries to derive it from the Subject, and hence reduces the Other to the Same.We then turn to two other phenomenological thinkers – Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, bothof whom are themselves critical of Husserl – to examine whether they provide a betteraccount, but conclude that (although each represents a certain advance over Husserl),neither are able to provide a decisively better account, since each is still too caught up inphenomenology and its focus on consciousness.In Part II of the thesis, we then turn to a non- (or even anti-) phenomenological thinker,namely Gilles Deleuze, to try and find an alternative theory that would be able to providethe account we seek. Our contention is that Deleuze, by seeking to give an account of theconstitution of the subject itself, simultaneously provides an account of the constitutionof the Other as arising at the same time as the Subject.Crucial to this account is the inversion of priority between the poles of a relation and therelation itself. Deleuze argues that a relation is 'external to its terms, and precedes theseterms. Hence, by returning to a level which precedes consciousness and the order ofknowledge – that is, by returning to the level of the virtual multiplicities and singularevents that underlie and precede the actualization of these events and multiplicities indistinct subjects and objects – we argue that Deleuze shows that, contra phenomenology,there is in fact no primordial separation between subject and Other. The contention istherefore that the problem of intersubjectivity as posed by phenomenology is a false onethat can be eluded by means of Deleuze's philosophy. This philosophy is not based on thesubject, but instead shows the subject to be the product of an underlying network ofrelations. Finally, we turn to Deleuze's appropriation of Nietzsche to trace out the transformation of'ethics that result from adopting a position like that of Deleuze.

[发布机构] Stellenbosch University