Defence against maritime power projection : the case of the Cape of Good Hope, 1756-1803

[摘要] ENGLISH ABSTRACT:The Cape of Good Hope, located at the southern tip of Africa, was very important for maritimecommunication with the East in the days of sailing ships. As the competition between the strongEuropean maritime empires for trade, sea power and empire in the East intensified during thelate eighteenth century, control of the Cape became a primary concern.The seventeenth century was the golden age of the United Provinces (the DutchRepublic) and through the VOC they dominated the trade with the East. By the lateseventeenth century English (later British) and French trade picked up dramatically, with theresult that the eighteenth century saw the slow decline of the Dutch state, sea power, sea-bornetrade, industries, shipbuilding and the VOC. The vacuum left by the decline of the Dutch, wasquickly taken up by their competitors. As French and British power eclipsed that of the Dutchand they fought each other, the United Provinces not only became a minor partner to one ofthem, but these wars also had a devastating effect on the Dutch Republic. During the sameperiod British global interest grew and her trade experienced a staggering increase. Withgrowing British interests in India and conflict with France, control of the sea route to the Eastand a secure base along this long and vulnerable route became essential to the British; whichenhanced the strategic value of the Cape of Good Hope. The Cape was in Dutch hands, whichwas not a problem to the British if the Dutch were allied to them, or stayed neutral during a war,but if the Dutch were in an alliance with France, it posed a great threat to British interests.Within the parameters of this thesis maritime power projection is the use of sea-bornemilitary forces to influence events on land directly, while defence against maritime powerprojection is the separate or joint defensive efforts at sea and on land to counter maritime powerprojection. Defence of the Cape against maritime power projection essentially involveddefensive efforts on three tiers or levels. Warships were present at times to deter an enemyfleet, or eliminate the threat it posed. Some important landing sites, beeches, anchorages andbays at the Cape were protected by a system of fortifications, while a garrison and militia forceswere thirdly available to man fortifications and counter an invader with military force.Navies were crucial and powerful foreign policy tools in the period under discussion.The maritime empires extensively relied on their navies to protect their trade, project theirpower, damage the interests of their enemies and defend their own interests. But, as the basesthat had to protect the vulnerable maritime communications and provided safety to ships alsohad to be secure, they were usually defended by a system of fortifications and a garrison. Thefixed defences the maritime empires created at their posts or bases were typical of thedevelopments in the fortification architecture of the West at the time and were primarilydesigned to provide defence against European adversaries. In terms of organisation, doctrine,weapons and tactics the armies of the maritime empires were again essentially European.To restrain the high costs and due to the difficulties related to relying extensively onEuropean soldiers, the maritime empires generally also relied on indigenously recruited troops.In fact, it would have been impossible to maintain these empires without local troops. At theCape this had two components: first the local militia created from the able-bodied men (amongstthe free burghers, voe officials, former soldiers, retired officials, freed slaves and persons ofmixed blood) living in Cape Town and the districts, and second the so-called Khoi Regiment,recruited in 1781-1782 and again between 1793 and 1803. It was not a Khoi unit in the tribalsense, but rather representative of a certain segment of the Cape population. The primarilyraison d'etre for the militia and the Khoi Regiment was defence against an external enemy andthey should not be confused with the so-called commando system that developed in the courseof the voe period for local defence purposes.Chronologically the study commences in 1756 with the outbreak of the Seven Years War(1756-1763). This date is important because the Franco-British struggle rapidly escalated to theEast and as a result the Cape acquired important strategic value to the belligerents. It was nowno longer just a refreshment post on the long, sea route to the East. During the ensuing wars,the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784) and the Wars of the French Revolution (1792-1802),Britain twice attempted to capture the Cape (1781 and 1795). The British attempt to capture theCape in 1781 was foiled by the presence of a powerful French naval and. military force, while in1795 the Dutch capitulated· to the British because the Cape was poorly defended and there waspolitical division amongst the defenders. A Dutch attempt to recapture the Cape in 1796 endedin failure due to the formidable British defence of the Cape. The study is brought to a close withthe handing back of the Cape to the Netherlands in 1803.A central theme which forms part of the discussion is the way in which states used theirnaval and military power to achieve their national objectives, in other words the strategies of themaritime empires of the day. Consequently the achievements and failures of the variouspoliticians, colonial administrators as well as naval and military commanders involved, wereevaluated. Furthermore, the defence of the Cape is examined with specific reference to theorganisation, nature and constitution of navies, fortifications, and armies of the time.A special effort was made to place emphasis on the relevance of an integrated or jointapproach to defence against maritime power projection and to identify a number of prerequisitesfor a successful defence. These include the joint or separate use of naval forces, fixeddefences and landward forces with the purpose of defence. In addition elements such asproper command and control, intelligence, cooperation between armies and navies, and thevalue of clear strategic and operational objectives were emphasised.

[发布机构] Stellenbosch University