Abortion, sentience and moral standing : a neurophilosophical appraisal

[摘要] ENGLISH ABSTRACT:Moral theories on abortion are often regarded as mutually exclusive. On the one hand,pro-life advocates maintain that abortion is always morally wrong, for life is sacredfrom its very beginning. On the other hand, the extreme liberal view advocated by theabsolute pro-ehoieers claims that the unborn is not a person and has no moralstanding. On this view there is no conflict of rights; women have the right to disposeof their body as they wish. Therefore, killing a non-person is always permissible. Inbetween the two extreme views, some moral philosophers argue that a 'pre-sentient'embryo or fetus cannot be harmed because it lacks the ability to feel pain or pleasure,for it is 'sentience' that endows a living entity (human and non-human) with moralconsiderability. Therefore, abortion of a pre-sentient embryo or fetus is permissible.Neurophilosophy rests a philosophical conclusion on neurological premises. In otherwords, to be tenable sentientism - the claim that sentience endows an entity withmoral standing - needs robust neurobiological evidence. The question is, then: What isthe basic neuroanatomical and neurophysiological apparatus required to be sentient?The answer to that question requires a fair understanding of the evolution, anatomyand function of the brain. The exploration thereof shows quite convincingly that theadvocates of sentientism do not provide convincing arguments to root their theory inneurobiological facts. Their claims rest rather on emotions and on behaviours thatlook like a reaction to pain. The other shortcoming of sentientism is that it fails todistinguish pain from suffering, and that as a utilitarian moral theory it considers onlythe alleged pain of the aborted sentient fetus and disregards the pregnant woman'spain and suffering. And, finally, sentientism leaves out of our moral considerationliving and non-living entities that deserve moral respect.The main thrust of the dissertation is that the argument of sentience as its advocatespresent it has no neurophilosophical grounds. Therefore, the argument from sentienceis not a convincing argument in favour or against abortion.

[发布机构] Stellenbosch University