Value, utility and autonomy : a moral-critical analysis of utilitarian positions on the value of prenatal life

[摘要] ENGLISH ABSTRACT:Problem statementFor utilitarians, human beings have intrinsic moral significance based on only twoacquired characteristics: sentience, or the ability to suffer, and psychologicalpersonhood. Sentience is the entrance-requirement for moral significance, but does notjustify a right to life claim; at most a right not to suffer. Personhood, described assome sort of self-conscious awareness with a concept of the future, may justify a rightto life claim. However, since personhood is absent in prenatal beings, and onlydevelops some time after birth, the implication is that such beings have little moralsignificance and may, for instance, be killed at will.The moral problem that I address in this dissertation is to investigate, assess andevaluate the utilitarian position on the moral status or value of prenatal life.Methodology and resultsI firstly, on the basis of an extensive literature study, make a detailed analysis of theutilitarian position with reference to a number of themes that I have identified in theirargument. This is followed by a critical philosophical evaluation of the utilitarianposition, based on six particular arguments:• Utilitarianism is philosophically incoherent. It over-simplifies the moralargument in claiming that consequences are all that matter morally. Itsunderlying moral theory is at odds with moral claims contained in contemporarynotions of human rights and individual justice. It ignores the moral significanceof special obligations to special groups.• Utilitarianism potentially has unacceptable consequences. It IS inherentlydiscriminatory and may lead to legitimate slippery slope fears.• Utilitarianism clashes with our fundamental moral intuitions on the value ofprenatal life. These intuitions are cherished in most world religions.• Contrary to the utilitarian position, speciesism is inevitable to the humancondition, especially argued from a position of existential phenomenology. Self- constitution, simultaneous constitution of the world as we know it, and the verypossibility of morality are possible only within a particular notion of speciesism.• The potentiality of pre-persons to develop into persons cannot be asconvincingly ignored as is done by the utilitarian.• There is a basic and underlying need and intuition to protect vulnerable humanbeings, of which pre-persons are exemplars. These notions clash with utilitariantheory.As an alternative, I introduce, set out and evaluate a two-phased position on the moralsignificance of pre-personal human life, a position of respectfulness of prenatal andpre-personal human life based upon its humanity, potentiality and separation-viability.This leads, firstly, to the conclusion of a graded, sliding scale conception of human prepersonalmoral significance in line with the level of development and with the actuationof potentiality. Secondly, it leads to the conclusion that the advent of separationsurvivability(viability) is a morally significant cut-off point beyond which the humanfetus may normally have a justifiable right to the continuation of its life.In as far as the application of my argument is concerned, I develop a moderateposition with reference to the abortion debate. Whilst I recognize that all humanprenatal beings of which it can be argued that they have a reasonable chance to developtheir intrinsic potentiality, i.e., to become full-fledged persons, should have theopportunity to do so, I also recognize that neither this position, nor the complexities oflife make it possible to hold absolute positions on the justifiability of abortion. Iexplore this extremely problematic notion in the text. That having been said, the adventof separation-survivability may imply a moral cut-off point, beyond whichtermination is only rarely justified. I argue that I find no moral hindrance to wellmotivatedresearch on human pre-embryos and stem cells.

[发布机构] Stellenbosch University