A close eye on SCOPA : A South African case study on parliamentary oversight and scrutiny

[摘要] ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Parliamentary scrutiny and oversight can be seen as themost important tool to hold the executive, and thereforegovernment, to account. It enforces an effective system ofchecks and balances in order to ensure that taxpayers arereceiving value for their money, and that their needs arebeing catered for. This thesis will analyze the oversightframework in South Africa by examining the structuresand functions of the Standing Committee on PublicAccounts (SCOPA) in contrast to other strong oversightframeworks such as exist in the US Congress andScandinavia. Dominant factors that affect the manner inwhich the executive is held to account, such as the role ofthe Chapter Nine Independent Institutions (the AuditorGeneral and the Public Protector) and their respectiveConstitutional mandates (versus the committee systemwhich has not been included as a section in theConstitution), will be brought into the spotlight. Also, theeffect that a dominant party system (ensuring an ANCmajority) has on parliamentary oversight will be comparedwith the Westminster system, which fails to effectivelyseparate governing party interests from the respectivemandates of the three spheres of government (thejudiciary, legislature and the executive). This candegenerate into feckless pluralism. An examination ofthese actors and factors will help determine the extent towhich SCOPA has been successful in enforcing theaccountability of organs of the state. By determining thestrengths and weaknesses of SCOPA, this thesis willdetermine whether the committee can be seen as the potentwatchdog of parliament, or the friendly 'Goofy-dog' ofgovernment. Important findings rest on the assumptionthat COPA is not isolated from party politics, and aninterdependent and complementary relationship betweenParliament, Parliamentary Committees and the ChapterNine Independent Institutions have not been consolidated.

[发布机构] Stellenbosch University