Not facing the other? : a Levinasian perspective on global poverty and transnational responsibility

[摘要] ENGLISH ABSTRACT:In this study it is asked why we do not consider ourselves guiltier and more responsiblewith regard to the thousands of people who, through no fault of their own, die daily frompreventable, poverty-related causes. Such neglect of the global poor is not surprising fromcertain perspectives. However, when the matter is approached from the perspective ofEmmanuel Levinas's ethical philosophy, one is faced with the paradox that Levinas claimswe are infinitely and inescapable responsible for the other, while the preventable dying ofthousands of poor people indicates that we do not behave as though we are infinitelyresponsible for the other.It would seem as though Levinas is crudely mistaken. However, Levinas distinguishesbetween an interpersonal ethical relation and an impersonal political relation with the other.The former is a relation of asymmetrical and infinite responsibility to which we aresummoned by the uniqueness of the other's 'face.' The latter is a relation in which the'third' is present, therefore requiring that the self limit his responsibility to a specific otherand disperse it amongst numerous others. The presence of the third indicates the beginningof impersonal justice, institutions, politics, knowledge, as well as equality and reciprocitybetween the self and the other. However, every person that I encounter is a general otherwith whom I stand in a political relation, while at the same time, also a specific other whocommands my infinite responsibility. With every other, I am simultaneously in asymmetrical political relation and an asymmetrical ethical relation. This is the ambiguity ofpolitical society: do I relate to the other politically or ethically? Both options enjoylegitimacy; however, from a Levinasian perspective, the choice to politically respond to theother less so.To understand our indifference to the global poor, this study analyses the principal debateabout transnational responsibility, the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, from aLevinasian perspective. Three ways in which the ethical relation with the extremely poorglobal other have been suppressed, thereby contributing to our ethical indifference to him,are identified. First, writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate seek to preserve thesubject in the greatest autonomy and freedom possible and thereby 'legitimise' a politicalresponse to the other. Second, when approaching the issue of global justice, cosmopolitanand communitarian theorists suppress the otherness of the other, which is what reminds usof our infinite responsibility for the other and the fact that justice is always incomplete.Third, insofar cosmopolitans prioritise and advocate a greater concern for the global poor,the strategy they favour (they emphasize human equality) is counterproductive for itoverlooks and suppresses the uniqueness of both the subject and the other in theinterpersonal ethical relation. The criticism of these three aspects of the cosmopolitancommunitariandebate is then extended into claims that a more ethical relating to theglobally poor than is presently the case is possible.

[发布机构] Stellenbosch University