Relations between South Africa and France with special reference to military matters, 1960-1990

[摘要] This dissertation investigates the role played by France in the supply of militaryequipment and the transfer of technology to South Africa from 1960. This Franco-SouthAfrican defence cooperation was opportune for South Africa, as she faced escalatinginternational criticism over the apartheid issue and, from December 1963, the firstmilitary embargo, one joined by her erstwhile arms suppliers.The accession of the National Party (NP) to power in South Africa in 1948 brought arange of legislation that gave substance to the nationalist policy of apartheid. Thesuffering of the South African black population and the refusal of the South Africangovernment to revise its domestic policy, despite the growing international pressure,induced the newly-independent, Afro-Asian countries to press the United Nations (UN)to take tougher actions against Pretoria. At the same time opposing Black Nationalistmovements, the African National Congress (ANC) the South West African Peoples'Organisation (SWAPO) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) adopted militant actionsin response to increasingly repressive race legislation in South Africa and South WestAfrica/Namibia.Furthermore, when in 1961 South Africa left the British Commonwealth, she lost thelong-term military commitment from London she had enjoyed for much of the twentiethcentury. South Africa would now have to satisfy her defence needs elsewhere. Pretoriaknew that she needed a strong, well-equipped defence force in order to face the growinginternal conflict as well as a possible military onslaught from outside the country.As a result, South Africa faced the first arms embargo in 1963 when her traditional armssuppliers, Britain and the USA elected to observe the voluntary terms of the embargoinstituted by the UN. France, at the time under the leadership of General Charles deGaulle, identified an opportunity to strengthen her relations with South Africa andacquire the much-needed strategic materials for her nuclear programme; he decided to fillthe space in the military market vacated by Britain and the USA. From 1964, Francebecame Pretoria's most important arms supplier, a relationship that lasted throughout theGaullist administration. De Gaulle's decision to supply South Africa with French military equipment and the transfer of technological know-how was based mainly on political,military and economic considerations. In short, De Gaulle wanted to free France from amilitary dependency on the United States, which had come to dominate NATO, and, byextension, Western Europe. Feeling hemmed in by les anglo-saxons, France, facing ashortage of North American uranium for her nuclear programme from 1957, sought newpartners to shore up her own strategic vulnerability and ensure a role for her in worldpolitics. Moreover, in the early 1960s, Apartheid had not yet become an electoral issue inFrance, as it was in Britain and the USA, and, in any case, France herself was drawingnegative comment for her actions in the Algerian war of national independence. Thelogical outcome was a comfortable rapprochement, for the moment at least, betweenParis and Pretoria.This military cooperation was broad-fronted and sustained until France implemented herfirst partial military embargo in 1975 and voted for the UN mandatory arms embargo in1977. But, by this time, the weapons industry in South Africa, home-grown with Frenchassistance, was well-established and placed South Africa in a position to launch militarycampaigns against the frontline states, commencing with Operation Savannah in late1975.This study analyses the content and impact of the military cooperation between Paris andPretoria and creates a better understanding of political and economic dimensions thatwere the key in the conduct of Franco-South African defence relations between 1960 and 1990.

[发布机构] Stellenbosch University