Darwin's doubt : implications of the theory of evolution for human knowledge

[摘要] ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this dissertation I enquire into the status, scope and limits of human knowledge, given thefact that our perceptual and cognitive faculties are the product of evolution by naturalselection. I argue that the commonsense representations these faculties provide us with yield aparticular, species-specific scope on the world that does not 'correspond' in anystraightforward way to the external world. We are, however, not bound by thesecommonsense representations. This particular, species-specific view of the world can betransgressed. Nevertheless, our transgressing representations remain confined to theconceptual space defined by the combinatorial possibilities of the various representationaltools we possess. Furthermore, the way in which we fit representations to the external world isby means of our biologically determined epistemic orientation. Based on the fact that we areendowed with a particular set of perceptual and cognitive resources and are guided by aparticular epistemic orientation, I conclude that we have a particular cognitive relation to theworld. Therefore, an accurate representation for us is a particular fit (our epistemicorientation) with particular means (our perceptual and cognitive resources).

[发布机构] Stellenbosch University