EPA negotiations between the EU and SADC/SACU grouping: partnership or asymmetry?

[摘要] Europe and Africa share a long history that is characterized both by oppression anddevelopment. The relationship between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbeanand Pacific (ACP) countries is a particularly important aspect of EU development cooperationpolicy. The developmental history between the EU and Africa started with the YaoundéConventions of 1963 and 1969, which were replaced by the Lomé Convention. Unfortunately,the favourable terms and preferential access for the ACP countries to Europe failed and theLomé Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in 2000. As aresult of a WTO-waiver, the discriminatory non-reciprocal trade preferences, which werepreviously enjoyed under the Lomé Convention, continued until December 2007. TheCotonou Agreement points out that these trade preferences will be replaced by joint WTOcompatibleEconomic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).During the EPA negotiations, the EU preferred to negotiate on a regional basisinstead of negotiating with the ACP as a whole or with individual countries. Consequently,Sub-Saharan Africa formed two negotiation groups; the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA)EPA group and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA group,represented by the five Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries, together withMozambique and Angola. Although Southern Africa is the region that leads the continent;from an economic perspective, the Southern African states show considerable disparities.Due to the economic differences between South Africa and the BLNS countries (Botswana,Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), the interests of the individual SACU countries are diverseand often contradictory, which resulted in complicated EPA negotiations. However,maintaining a favourable long-term trading relationship with the EU is of great importance tothe economic and political well-being of the SADC, since the EU is the main trading partnerof most African countries. By December 2007, an interim EPA (IEPA) was initialled by theBLNS countries as a result of the pressure to fall back to the unfavourable GeneralizedSystem of Preferences (GSP). Due to the bilateral Trade Development and CooperationAgreement (TDCA) that is in force between South Africa and the EU, South Africa was notnegatively influenced by the expiry of the WTO-waiver.The EPA will have a negative impact on regional integration within SADC and willpromote distinction within the regional economic communities. Duty free, quota free accesswas offered to the BLNS countries, but the EU did not extend this offer to South Africabecause of the developmental status of the country and the pre-existing TDCA.Consequently, South Africa will be required to export at higher prices and will experienceincreased competition within the region. The downside of the removal of import tariffs for theBLNS countries is that government revenues will decrease, which might result in incomelosses and will accentuate poverty. The standstill-clause of the IEPA prevents the SACUcountries from diversifying economically and from developing new industries. The Most-Favoured Nation clause primarily impacts negatively on South Africa, since it prevents SouthAfrica from negotiating freely with other countries such as Brazil and China. Furthermore, thestrict intellectual property rules of the IEPA undermine access to knowledge and hereby failto support innovation. The content of a chapter on liberalization of services, that will beincluded in the full EPA, is still being negotiated. Liberalization of services might lead to moreforeign investments in the BLNS countries, as a result of which the quality of services willincrease, leading to better education, infrastructure and more job opportunities. However,foreign companies will gain power at the expense of African governments and companies.South Africa is the main supplier of services in the BLNS countries and will therefore beconfronted with economic losses when the services sector is liberalized.From an economic nationalist perspective, the EU included numerous provisions inthe IEPA that were not necessary for WTO compatibility. However, the EU is aware of theimportance of trade agreements for the BLNS countries and found itself in the position to doso to fulfil its own interests. By making use of the expiry date of the WTO waiver; the IEPAwas initialled by the BLNS countries within a relatively short period of time. South Africa, inits own national interests, opposed the provisions of the IEPA, which has led to thenegotiations deadlock.Because of the economic power and negotiating tactics of the EU and the selfinterestedattitude of South Africa in this respect, regional integration is undermined and thepoorest countries are once again the worst off. Although Economic Partnership Agreementshave to be established, the partnership-pillar is, in my opinion, hard to find.

[发布机构] Stellenbosch University