Morality and Freedom: a critical investigation of the relatedness of morality and freedom, and its significance for the moral justification of the practice of biomedical moral enhancement

[摘要] ENGLISH SUMMARY: Recent scientific developments in areas such as biotechnology and biomedicine have led to arevolution in the field of biomedical enhancement and to the emergence of innovative and revolutionary possibilities of human enhancement. Biomedical scientists have been able to discover ways in which human beings could not only be enhanced in terms of their physiological make up, but also possibly with regard to their moral convictions and inclinations. Several advocates of this new possibility, referred to as biomedical moral enhancement, have maintained that biomedical moral enhancement could alter the current generally irresponsible and self-centred practices of people throughout the world today, create a sustainable future for forthcoming generations and the planet and make people morally better. Other scholars, on the other hand, have pointed out that the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement raises a number of important philosophical questions that require us to explore, understand and critically evaluate the practice as well as its possible implications. This study focuses on two of those important questions raised by the possibility of interventions of biomedical moral enhancement. The first question has to do with the nature and content of the norms in terms of which moral enhancements could be measured. The second, evenmore pertinent, issue is the question as to whether morality or a true moral disposition can be reconciled with the social determination that seems to inevitably follow from moral enhancement projects. In other words, does the fact of being morally better come at the cost of the exercise ofindividuals' freedom? Will people be morally better just because they have been 'programmed or 'determined to be so? And if this is the case, how can a true moral disposition, which seemingly inevitably involves the agent's freedom to choose the less moral choice or behaviour, be reconciledwith the social determinism that seems to inevitably follow from interventions of moral enhancement? In the attempt to find an answer to the question raised above, this study investigates whether interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would curtail individuals' freedom and, ifthis is the case, whether this might affect individuals' ability to behave morally. This study is going to argue that a specific type of interventions of biomedical moral enhancement, namely behaviouroriented interventions might pose a threat to individuals' freedom to fall and to conclude that, although interventions of biomedical moral enhancement might make people behave so as to bringabout the morally desirable outcome, they will fail to make people morally better and also make the very notion of morality meaningless and worthless. This is because the curtailment of the freedom to fall, i.e. to behave immorally, also involves the curtailment of the freedom to stand, i.e. to behave morally.

[发布机构] Stellenbosch University