The role of third party intervention in Africa's civil conflicts: The case of South Africa's peace mission in Burundi (1999-2004)

[摘要] ABSTRACTThis research investigates the role played by external actors in contemporary Africancivil conflicts with specific attention to South Africa’s leading role in addressingBurundi’s intractable civil conflict. The inquiry was guided by looking at SA’s effortsin managing Burundi’s peace process in partnership with key external parties such asthe Regional Initiative for peace in Burundi, AU and the UN; and by examining thelevel of success of SA’s involvement in the peace process and limitations encounteredin pursuing diplomatic/political and military efforts aimed at resolving the civilconflict. The theories of conflict resolution and protracted social change, andscholarly and policy literature on intervention were drawn upon to frame the research.The struggle for political power explains the key root cause to Burundi’s civilconflict; rival politicians manipulated ethnicity and the past injustices, which arerooted in colonial policies of divide and rule, as tools in an attempt to accede to powerand thereby, gain economic advantage at the expense of others. SA diplomatic effortsplayed an important role in addressing this by advocating for political and militarypower sharing.In order to reconcile and manage differences in approaches that were advocated to deal withthe Burundi civil conflict, SA mobilized for support in Burundi’s neighbouring countries soas to back a peaceful solution to address the conflict. Further, in an effort to bolster itstroops and, therefore, expand operations designed to promote peace in Burundi, SAhad to merge into the African Mission in Burundi, and cooperate with the UN in orderfor the latter to render impetus to the peace process by, providing necessary resourcesand political support for the Burundi peace mission, and subsequently to assume themission by taking over from the African mission.Although SA’s troop deployment provided protection for the former Hutu exilepoliticians and thereby, encouraged them to participate in negotiations and thetransitional government, which participation increased chances of success in the peaceprocess, however, SA did not do much in peacekeeping under the UN due toinadequate military equipments; civilians continued to be killed in the presence of SAtroops, even though, under the UN their role extended to include civilian protection. To the extent that SA’s intensive diplomatic efforts resulted in the Arusha Peace andReconciliation Agreement for Burundi, however, a number of Burundian parties didnot participate in the signing of the agreement and the rebel movements wereexcluded from the process. Thus, the Arusha peace process failed to attain consensusin addressing Burundi’s contentious issues.Although the UN peacekeepers in Burundi, of which SA was part, had a Chapter VIImandate to enforce the peace of which civilian protection was part of their mission,they did not exercise it. Intervention was constrained by the Burundian government;they argued that the ultimate authority in maintaining security throughout the countryrested on them. Moreover, it is difficult if not impossible to observe UN traditionalpeacekeeping norms while at the same time having to implement the responsibility toprotect, which has been occasioned by the post-Cold War world, in which humanrights have gained wider recognition, and international norms of sovereignty and noninterventionredefined. Thus, strict observance of the UN traditional peacekeepingnorms, inhibit intervention aimed to protect civilians facing catastrophiccircumstances or under imminent threat.

[发布机构] University of the Witwatersrand