A case for epistemological realism.

[摘要] The Epistemological Realist (ER)project, recently initiated by John McDowell inMind and World and Hilary Putnam in his 1994 series of Dewey Lectures, is anextremely promising one. This project aims to show how a 'commonsense realism'about the world and our relationship to it can be made tenable in a philosophicalclimate increasingly dominated by various forms of anti-realism. At least part of thereason for the prevalence of anti-realism is the unsatisfactory way in which realismhas traditionally been developed. Epistemological Realism departs from TraditionalRealism in at least three key areas: (a) its account of how perception enablesempirical knowledge, (b) its account of perception itself and (c) its account of howour empirical knowledge claims bear on reality. The ability of the ER theorist to giveperfectly satisfactory accounts of (a)-(c) does much to reinstate 'commonsenserealism' as a philosophically respectable position.Epistemological Realism 'commonsense realism' Traditional Realism antirealismperception empirical knowledge reality John McDowell Mind andWorld Hilary Putnam

[发布机构] University of the Witwatersrand