Bureaucratic Appointments in Argentina

[摘要] Studying the appointment process is essential for understanding the way modern bureaucracies interrelate with politics. In Latin America, bureaucracies have traditionally operated more as arms of the elected officials rather than an as professionals who are autonomous from the political process. In this dissertation, I explain that this politicization and its effects are defined by the process by which bureaucrats are appointed. The power to appoint bureaucrats is one of the president’s most important powers and is vital to the latter’s administrative power and policy influence. Given its importance, this dissertation explores the dynamics of presidential appointments to the bureaucracy by analyzing a database of more than thirty thousand presidential decrees and determining when the president decides to appoint an individual to a position (Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary, Undersecretary or lower echelons). Exploring, describing and explaining how the President utilizes this political tool is a fascinating way of grasping how executives build political support in Argentina. In short, this dissertation is concerned with defining the logic of bureaucratic politicization. Using quantitative and qualitative information, a central finding of the study is that, at least in Argentina, presidents use their appointment power to build coalitions among party factions. In other cases presidents would face cross-party pressures, but in the Argentine context I show that the president uses the appointments to build intra-party support.

[发布机构] the University of Pittsburgh