The controversy between Russell and Bradley concerning the doctrine of internal relations

[摘要] More than any other philosopher Bertrand Russell is thought to have refuted the Absolute Idealism of Francis Herbert Bradley. He is supposed to have done this by showing that Bradley;;s doctrine of internal relations is contradictory and inadequate. In this thesis I reexamine the controversy between Russell and Bradley concerning the doctrine of internal relations in an attempt to determine whether Russell did, in fact, refute Bradley. In the first chapter I show how Bradley;;s internal relations reside on the level of understanding which is between the level of feeling and the level of the Absolute. In the second chapter I show how Bradley himself rejects the whole level of understanding including both internal and external relations as mere appearance. He does this primarily by showing that relations have what I call a ;;dual nature;; which means that they must be but cannot be both unifiers and constituents of complexes. In the third chapter I show how Russell;;s understanding of relations emerged from his belief that the structure of language parallels the structure of extra-linguistic reality and that Russell also discovers the dual nature problem. In the fourth chapter I examine Russell;;s powerful arguments against internal relations and conclude that they are effective. Russell;;s and Bradley;;s arguments, however, show that external relations, which are necessary for Russell;;s own pluralism, are also impossible due to the dual nature problem. It seems that Russell rather than Bradley is refuted. In the fifth chapter I consider whether any contemporary writers have identified and solved the dual nature problem. Both Alvin Nelson and Timothy Sprigge have distinguished between what they call the ;;holistic;; and other interpretations of internal relations. I show that neither Nelson nor Sprigge captures Bradley;;s meaning and that the problem remains unsolved. In the last chapter I present the outlines of a solution which is suggested by the dual nature problem itself. In this solution properties are unifiers and relations are ;;diversifiers;; and a theory of levels or types is required. In the end it is not clear that even this solution solves the dual nature problem.

[发布机构] Rice University