Locke's theory of personal identity: A causal interpretation

[摘要] In this thesis I argue for a novel interpretation of Book II, Chapter xxvii of Locke;;s Essay concerning Human Understanding according to which Locke;;s theory of identity is taken to be an Aristotelian four-causal theory. On this interpretation, we are the same person as anyone who efficiently causes us to remember being them. More particularly, two diachronically distinct persons x and y are the same person just in case either x causes y to remember being x or y causes x to remember being y; and two contemporaneous persons x and y are the same just in case for all diachronically prior persons z, z causes x to remember being z if and only if z causes y to remember being z. While this interpretation suffers from the drawbacks that Locke nowhere articulated such a view and had a well-known antipathy for scholastic notions generally, I argue that it has certain advantages. In addition to being at least consistent with Locke;;s dicta on causation, it is both formally and substantively adequate. Moreover, it reflects Locke;;s unconscious enmeshment in scholastic notions, and is useful as a heuristic; it sheds light on some of the more obscure aspects of the text (e.g., §12 and the concept of ;;man;;). I conclude with the hope that future research will provide even more support for this novel interpretation.

[发布机构] Rice University