Can Cell to Cell Thermal Runaway Propagation be Prevented in a Li-ion Battery Module?

[摘要] Increasing cell spacing decreased adjacent cell damage center dotElectrically connected adjacent cells drained more than physically adjacent cells center dotRadiant barrier prevents propagation when fully installed between BP cells center dotBP cells vent rapidly and expel contents at 100% SOC -Slower vent with flame/smoke at 50% -Thermal runaway event typically occurs at 160 degC center dotLG cells vent but do not expel contents -Thermal runaway event typically occurs at 200 degC center dotSKC LFP modules did not propagate; fuses on negative terminal of cell may provide a benefit in reducing cell to cell damage propagation. New requirement in NASA-Battery Safety Requirements document: JSC 20793 Rev C 5.1.5.1 Requirements - Thermal Runaway Propagation a. For battery designs greater than a 80-Wh energy employing high specific energy cells (greater than 80 watt-hours/kg, for example, lithium-ion chemistries) with catastrophic failure modes, the battery shall be evaluated to ascertain the severity of a worst-case single-cell thermal runaway event and the propensity of the design to demonstrate cell-to-cell propagation in the intended application and environment. NASA has traditionally addressed the threat of thermal runaway incidents in its battery deployments through comprehensive prevention protocols. This prevention-centered approach has included extensive screening for manufacturing defects, as well as robust battery management controls that prevent abuse-induced runaway even in the face of multiple system failures. This focused strategy has made the likelihood of occurrence of such an event highly improbable. b. The evaluation shall include all necessary analysis and test to quantify the severity (consequence) of the event in the intended application and environment as well as to identify design modifications to the battery or the system that could appreciably reduce that severity. In addition to prevention protocols, programs developing battery designs with catastrophic failure modes should take the steps necessary to assess the severity of a possible thermal runaway event. Programs should assess whether there are reasonable design changes that could appreciably affect the severity of the outcome. Evaluation should include environmental effects to surrounding hardware (i.e., temperature, pressure, shock), contamination effects due to any expelled contaminates, and venting propulsive effects when venting overboard.

[发布日期] 2014-09-25

[学科分类] 电子与电气工程